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SCHOOL FEES IN PUBLIC EDUCATIONI.

INTRODUCTION

The United States, from its beginning, has promoted the
ideal that education is important to the continuance of our
society. 1 Thomas Jefferson stated:
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the
people alone. The people themselves therefore are the only safe
depositories. And to render even them safe their minds must be
improved to a certain degree. This indeed is not all that is
necessary, though it be essentially necessary. 2

All states are required to establish and maintain a public
school system and a majority are required by their
constitutions to have a "free" educational system. 3 A truly free
education is still not a reality however, as many states allow

1.
See Augustus F. Hawkins, Becoming Preeminent in Education: America's
Greatest Challen,.;e, 14 HARV. J.L. & PI.JB. PoL 'y 367, 371-72 (1991) (referring to the
Land Ordinance Act of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which when
passed under the Articles of Confederation "linked the drawing of property lines to
inclusion of schools"). ld. at 372. The Northwest Ordinance explicitly stated that
"religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever by [sic]
encouraged." ld. at 372 n.18 (citing David Tyack & Thomas James, Education for a
Republic: Federal Influence on Public Schooling in the Nation's First Century, THIS
CONSTITUTION Winter 1985, at 17.) (emphasis added).
2.
3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 254 (P. Ford ed., 1892), quoted in
Patricia Jo Kendall, Public School Fees in Illinois: A Re-examination of
Constitutional and Policy Questions, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 99.
3.
The following state constitutional provisions mandate the establishment of a
public education system; ALA. CONST. art. XIV, amend. 111, § 256; ALASKA CONST.
art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IOWA CONE>'T. art.
IX, § 12; KY. CONS!'. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONE>'T. art. VIII, pt. 1,
§ 1; MAss. CONE>'T. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art.
XI, § 2; N.H. CONE>"!'. pt. 2, art. 83; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OR. CaNST. art. VIII,
§ 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 68; WASH. CONE>"!'. art. IX, §
2; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1, § 9.
The following require some form of free public education or that no tuition be
charged: ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5; CoLO. CaNST. art. IX,
§ 2; CONN. CONE>'T. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, §
1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art.
X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1, § 6(b); MD. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; MICH. CONE>'T. art. VIII, § 2; MISS. CONE>"!'. art. VIII, § 201; Mo.
CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3); NEB. CONST. art. VII, §1; N.J.
CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
N.C. CONST. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, §1;
S.C. CONST. art. XI, §3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12;
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W. VA. CaNST. art.XII, § 1;
WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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fees for both academic and non-academic activities. 4 These fees
hinder the full participation of low-income children in the
educational system. These children are denied the right to
participate in school programs and activities because of their
inability to pay the required fee. This is true even where fee
waiver policies are purportedly available to ensure low income
children an equal opportunity to participate.
This paper will address the current federal and state law
regarding the right to education when school fees are imposed.
Part II will discuss education as a fundamental right under the
federal constitution. Part III will address the different
interpretations of free education under the state constitutions,
and how different courts apply these interpretations. Part IV
will review the policy objectives of a free education system and
discuss alternatives under the current state programs.
Additionally, current trends in state fee and fee waiver policies
will be examined. This section will conclude by proposing that
the best way to achieve the policy objectives in education is to
abolish all fees in the public schools through free education
clauses in state constitutions.
II: THE RIGHT To FREE EDUCATION UNDER
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
The right to an education is not explicitly protected in the
federal constitution, 5 and the Supreme Court has refused to
recognize education as an implied fundamental right. 6
However, the Court has recognized the importance of education
in our democratic system7 by declaring education to be an

4.
See Roger W. Hamm & Sandra Crosser, School Fees, 178 THE AMERICAN
SCHOOL BOARD JoURNAL 29, (June 1991) (According to a survey of the
Departments of Education in all fiO states and the District of Columbia, 34 states
permit some type of student fees, including textbook fees, lab fees, class fees,
activity fees, supplies and equipment, field trip, and participation fees for extra
curricular activities).
5.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3fi (1973).
6.
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988). See also
Suzanne McAlpine, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools: Will Education Ever Be
Deemed a Fundamental Right?, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 629, 634 (1990).
7.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (19fi4), stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recopnition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in
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important governmental interest. 8 This section will describe
the Court's shifting treatment of this interest in three leading
education cases and will analyze how the Court's decisions
apply to school fee cases.
A. San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,9
the Supreme Court upheld the Texas school financing scheme
against an equal protection claim. The parents, representing
minority and poor residents in districts with low property tax
bases, claimed that the system subjected poor students to a
lower quality education. The system's reliance on local property
taxes resulted in lower per pupil expenditure in poorer
districts. 10
The Court declined to apply a strict scrutiny standard of
review, 11 holding that wealth was not a suspect classification,
and that education was not a fundamental right adversely
affected by the Texas scheme. 12 In determining that wealth
was not a suspect class in this case, the Court inquired

awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
ld. at 492 (emphasis added).
See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("We have recognized 'the
public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government . . . .'")
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. See also, Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the
8.
Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1086.
9.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
ld. at 1.
10.
11.
In reviewing state action under the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, the Court generally uses a two tiered approach. The Court applies
strict scrutiny to cases involving either a suspect class, such as race or gender, or
a fundamental right, such as the right to interstate travel or the right to a
criminal appeal. In order to pass constitutional muster under this standard the
state action must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. In cases
where no suspect classification is made and no fundam~ntal interest is involved,
the Court will apply a more deferential rational basis review, which requires only
that the state action bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
See McAlpine, supra note 6, at 631-32.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28, 35.
12.
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whether an inability to pay resulted in an "absolute deprivation
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that [educational]
benefit." 13 Two types of wealth classification cases have been
held suspect: fees which deny indigent criminals an adequate
trial or appeal, 14 and voting cases which deny free access to
the ballot. 15 The Court found no definable class in Rodriguez
which was absolutely deprived of an education by the Texas
financing scheme. 16 In so holding, the Court left open the
issue of whether wealth could be a suspect class in other
education cases, such as those dealing with school fees. 17
The Court further held that education was not a
fundamental right. It reasoned that although education is
important to society, this "does not determine whether it must
be regarded as fundamental ... :ns The key factor in
determining fundamentality is "whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution."19 Education is neither. 20 The Court reasoned
that holding education to be a fundamental right would require
the Court to become a "super-legislature.'121 The court would
be forced to declare rights constitutionally protected without
explicit or implicit authority. 22 The Court conceded, however,
that there might be some "identifiable quantum" of education
guaranteed by the Constitution, but the Texas scheme met this
requirement. 23
The Court also emphasized the importance of state and
local control of education, noting that education financing has

!d. at 20.
!d. at 21.
!d. at 22.
16.
!d. at 22-25.
17.
The Court in a footnote stated:
An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however, in which
the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer.
If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State
only to those able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil there would
be a clearly defined class of 'poor' people-definable in terms of their
inability to pay the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded
from receiving an education. That case would present a far more compelling
set of circumstances for judicial assistance . . . .
!d. at 25 n.60.
18.
!d. at 30.
19.
!d. at 33-34.
20.
!d. at 35.
21.
!d. at 35.
!d. at 31.
22.
23.
!d. at 36-37 .
13.
14.
15.
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traditionally been a state function. 24 The Court then deferred
to state legislatures to solve school financing woes,
emphasizing the possibility of more than one constitutionally
permissible solution. 25
Rodriguez represents the general rule, that in most cases
the Court will examine the state educational financing schemes
under a rational basis standard. The Court may apply strict
scrutiny if it can be shown that children are being absolutely
deprived of a basic education based on their inability to pay a
fee. 26
B. Plyler v. Doe.

In Plyler v. Doe,27 the Supreme Court took a step toward
acknowledging education as a fundamental right, striking down
a statute denying illegal alien children the same free public
education provided to citizens and legally admitted aliens. The
Texas statute withheld state funds for the education of illegal
alien children from local school districts and authorized the
districts to deny these children enrollment. 28
The Court struck down the statute using an intermediate
standard of review. 29 Determining that the illegal alien
children constituted a suspect classification, the Court focused
24.
!d. at 40.
!d. at 42. The court also stressed how grave an effect an alternative ruling
25.
would have on states. "[I]t would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater
potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which we
are urged to abrogate the systems of financing public education presently in
existence in virtually every State." !d. at 44.
26.
!d. at 2fi n.60. See supra, note 16.
The court had an opportunity to determine a school fee case prior to Rodriguez.
In Johnson v. N.Y. Dept. of Ed., 409 U.S. 75 (1972) children were not allowed to
participate in class if they had not paid the required textbook fee. The case
however, was remanded to the district court when the school district voters elected
to assess taxes to purchase books for indigent children to use. The Court has not
specifically ruled on this type of case with the limited exceptions of Plyler v. Doe,
and Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., which will be discussed in the next sections.
27.
457 u.s. 202 (1982).
!d. at 205, The statute also implicitly allowed the districts to charge tuition
28.
as an alternative to denying enrollment outright. The statute provides: "The board
of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the
public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens
of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not over
21 years of age . . . ." TEX. Enuc. CODE ANN. sec. 21.031 (Vernon supp. 1981). !d.
at 206 n.l.
29.
The test used was whether the classification served an "important
governmental objectives" and was "substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Biegel, supra note 8, at 1094.
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on the children's inability to affect their "parent's conduct" or
"their own status."30 The Court reasoned that "imposing
disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 31 The Texas statute
discriminated on the "basis of a legal characteristic over which
the children [had] little control."32
·
The Court conceded that education was not a "right"
granted by the Constitution, but the Court underscored the
importance of education to the preservation of our "democratic
system of government."33 Finally, the Court emphasized the
stigmatizing effect that withholding an education would have
on these children. "By denying these children a basic education,
we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our
civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of
our Nation."34
The analysis of Plyler could be used to successfully
challenge school fees. Indigent children are no more responsible
for their status than are illegal alien children. Nor do indigent
children have the means to change or control the financial
status of their parents. Thus, it could be concluded that any
denial of an educational opportunity to indigent children based
on their inability to pay a fee should be struck down under the
same heightened standard used in Plyler. 35 The Court,

30.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
31.
ld., quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
32.
ld. (the Court compared this case to cases involving illegitimacy such as
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)).
33.
ld. at 221, (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963). The Court stated further:
[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead
economically productive lives to the benefit of all . . . . We cannot ignore
the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are
denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social
order rests.
[D]enial of education to some isolated group of children poses an affront
one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement
the basis of individual merit . . . . "[E]ducation prepares individuals to
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.
ld. at 221-22 (citation omitted).
34.
ld. at 223.
35.
Biegel, supra note 8, at 1098-99.

to
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however, refused to apply the heightened standard to school
transportation fees in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools. 36
C. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools.
In Kadrmas, a student challenged the constitutionality of a
North Dakota statute permitting non-reorganized school
districts to charge a fee for door to door bus services. 37 The
Court, refusing to extend Plyler to this case/8 applied a
deferential rational basis analysis and upheld the statute. 39
The Court would not extend Plyler "beyond the 'unique
circumstances' that provoked its 'unique confluence of theories
and rationales."'40 Heightened scrutiny was held generally
applicable only to "discriminatory classifications based on sex
or illegitimacy."41 The Court explained that the child in this
case was not denied services because of her parents' illegal
conduct, but by their refusal to pay the user fee. 42 The Court
concluded that the fee would neither create a "sub-class of
illiterates,"43 nor leave the child without an alternative source
of transportation. 44 The state does not have a monopoly on
transporting students, and in this case the child could and did
find alternative transportation to school. 45 The fact that the
Kadrmas child was not prevented from attending school during
the time she was denied bus service was crucial to the Court's
decision. 46
Kadrmas effectively precludes a challenge to school fees in
the Supreme Court, unless a child is absolutely denied the
right to an education and no alternative means for protecting
that right are provided. Success, however, is unlikely
considering the current atmosphere of the CourtY Thus, the
36.
487 U.S. 450 (1988). Biegel applied in Kadrmas the heightened standard
and reached the same result as the Court. Biegel, supra note 8, at 1098.
37.
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 41i0 (the statute required reorganized districts to
provide the same services for free).
ld. at 460.
38.
39.
ld. at 461 (The statute will be upheld if "it bears a rational relation to a
legitimate government objective.").
40.
Id. at 459 (citations ommitted).
41.
Id.
42.
ld.
43.
ld.
44.
Id. at 460.
ld. at 460-61. The court did not examine the practical effect of the
45.
alternative but emphasized that an alternative did exist.
46.
Id. at 458.
47.
The trend currently in the Court disfavors the recognition of new
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practical result is that states will be allowed to burden the
"access of poor persons to an education" denying them an
"equal opportunity" and hope for full participation in our
society. 48
School fee challenges now must be made at the state
level. 49 Education clauses in state constitutions offer a strong
theoretical basis for challenging school fees in the state
courts. 50 An examination of state constitutions and their
treatment of school fees will be discussed in the next section.
Ill. SCHOOL FEES AND THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

The education articles of state constitutions articulate "the
state's role in public education."51 Virtually all state
constitutions require states to "establish some system of free
public schools."52 The language of the constitutions varies, and
state courts differ in their interpretations of what "free"
means. 53 The following sections will discuss the two analytical
models used by state courts in school fee cases. Additionally,
current fee policies will be reviewed, including types of fees
charged and how they are treated under the differing analyses.

A. Hamer v. Board of Education:
An Historical Approach.
In Hamer v. Board of Educ., 54 the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that a textbook rental fee did not violate the "free
schools" provision of the Illinois constitution. 55 The court
interpreted the "free schools" clause according to the "natural

"fundamental interests." See Biegel, supra note 8, at 1097.
48.
Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49.
See Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation:
A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'¥ 516, fi43 (1991). Federal
challenges might still be possible if Congress were to condition receipt of federal
education funding on a requirement that states equalize educational resources
among school districts. See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 390.
Cf Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
50.
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308 (1991).
51.
Underwood, supra note 49, at 532.
52.
McUsic, supra note 50, at 311. See also Thomas J. Pepe & Alice L. Tufts,
Commentary, Pay for Play: Fees {or Extra-Curricular Activities, 16 EDUC. L. RPTR.
1013, 1026 (1984); Note, School Law-The Constitutional Mandate for Free Schools,
1971 WIS. L. REV. 971, 973.
53.
See Underwood, supra note 49 at 529.
54.
265 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 1971).
55.
!d. at 622.
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and popular meaning of the language used as it was
understood at the time the constitution was adopted."56 Upon
tracing the history of the free schools provision, the court
concluded that the provision only required the furnishing of a
"schoolhouse and teachers at public expense," 57 not
textbooks. 58
Courts using a Hamer-type analysis find the meaning of
"free education" either "inherently or contextually
ambiguous."59 These courts look to the intent of the "framers"
to determine the scope of free education. 60 They look at the
educational practices at the time the constitution was adopted
to establish what was intended. 61
In applying this analysis, courts have generally allowed
fees for textbooks and other educational materials. 62 They are
split, however, on course and activity fees. 63 In sum, courts
using Hamer's historical approach are "unconcerned with
whether an item is important to education."64 A fee may be

56.
ld. at 620.
57.
ld.
58.
ld. at 621.
59.
Patricia M. Harris, Student Fees in Public Schools: Defining the Scope of
Education, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1401, 1405 (1987). A list of cases following the Hamer
approach is given at id. at 1403 n.25.
60.
ld. at 1406.
61.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 103.
62.
See e.g., Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106 (1980)
(upholding fees for fungible supplies and materials used in individual courses,
locker rental, musical instrument rental and rental or purchase of gym uniforms.);
Marshall v. School Dist. re #3 Morgan County, 553 P.2d 784 (1976) (absolving
school districts of the responsibility to provide free textbooks to all students); Beck
v. Board of Educ., 344 N.E.2d 440 (1976) (upholding fees for workbooks and other
educational materials and supplies charged to parents financially able to pay
them); Board of Educ. v. Sinclair, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974) (permitting fees for
textbooks and similar fees).
The following items have been considered educational materials: magazine
subscriptions, learning center supplies, file folders, paint, glue, chalk, pencils and
marking pens, locks, towels, atlases, pamphlets, paperback books kept by the
school, laboratory supplies, home economics supplies and industrial arts supplies.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 108 n.55.
Current trends suggest that Hamer could be used to justify fees for "secretarial
services, school nurses, physical education equipment, desks, chairs, [and] library
books . . . ." ld. at 112.
63.
Compare, Sneed, 264 S.E.2d at 109-110 (allowed fees for credit courses
including art, typing, vocational education and science, some were required courses,
others were elective) with, Sinclair, 222 N.W.2d at 48 (struck down fees for any
course required or elective). See also Harris, supra note 59, at 1409.
64.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 105.
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charged, regardless of an item's educational value, unless it
was historically provided free. 65
Commentators have three main criticisms of the Hamer
analysis. First, the assertion that "free" is textually ambiguous
is against the "weight of judicial authority. 'Free' is an absolute
term rather than one of degree."66 The fact that different
constitutions may have provisions describing the educational
system does not render the term "free" ambiguous. "Free"
means without cost. The additional requirements define the
nature of that state's educational system. They do not affect
what will be provided free by the state. 67
Second, critics claim that Hamer is not based on a reliable
precedent. 68 Before 1970, no case had dealt with a school fees
issue under a state constitutional challenge. 69 The discussion
of free schools in Segar v. Board of Education, 70 relied on in
Hamer, has been described as "dictum.'m According to these
critics, any precedent before 1970 "supporting courts' decisions
on either side is suspect."72
Finally, critics argue that Hamer ignores the
advancements made in education over the last century. 73 It is
"inapposite to contemporary views about what constitutes an
education.''74 This "historical approach freezes . . . education"
and "eviscerates the inherent nature of education as
progress.''75 These critics prefer to interpret free education
under the state constitutions using a plain meaning

65.
ld.
66.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1407.
67.
Id. 1407-08.
68.
ld.
69.
ld.; Kendall, supra note 2, at 111.
70.
148 N.E. 289 (Ill. 1925).
71.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 111 ("[T]he specific controversy before the court
did not involve a constitutional mandate for free textbooks, but rather involved
interpretation of the Free Textbook Act and the constitutionality of damage
deposits.").
72.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1408.
73.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 113.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1408. The author stated:
74.
Today, . . . more courses are offered in the course of a school year. A
different text is usually required for each grade or level of study, and
teaching methods and technological advancements result in a higher
textbook replacement rate. These factors combine to create a much heavier
financial burden on students today than students faced 100 years ago.
ld. at 1408 n.67.
75.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 113.
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approach. 76 This approach will be discussed in the next
section.

B. The Plain Meaning Approach:
Paulson/Bond and Their Progeny
The plain meaning approach was initially applied in
Paulson v. Minidoka County Sch. Dist., 77 and Bond v. Ann
Arbor Sch. Dist. .78 Under this approach, courts look to the
"plain ordinary meaning of the constitutional language ...."79
Courts first determine if the constitutional language allows any
fees. 80 Where the constitution calls for "free" schools, the
courts have interpreted "free" to mean "without cost or
charge."81 Following this determination, the court then must
determine "whether the activity or item subject to charge
constitutes 'education."'82 In making this determination, the
courts in Paulson and Bond have developed separate tests.
These tests have been used together and separately to
determine the scope of free education in subsequent school fee
cases. 83 The following section will review these cases and
describe the treatment of different types of fees using these
analyses.

1. Paulson v. Minidoka County School District.

Paulson involved a challenge to a twenty-five dollar fee for
school activities and a twenty-five dollar fee for textbooks.
Paulson was denied a copy of his transcript, needed to enroll in
the state university because he had failed to pay the fees. 84
The Supreme Court of Idaho held that the high schools fell

76.
See, Harris, supra note 59, at 1411; Kendall, supra note 2, at 103.
77.
463 P.2d 935 (Idaho 1970).
78.
178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970).
79.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 102.
80.
ld. at 103.
81.
Bond, 178 N.W.2d at 487.
82.
ld.
83.
See, Kelley v. East Jackson Pub. Sch., 372 N.W.2d 638, 639 (1985)
(applying both the "necessary elements of any school's activity" test and the
"integral fundamental part of the educational process" test). But see ParsippanyTroy Hills Educ. Ass'n, 457 A.2d 15, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (applying
only the Bond integral test).
For a list of other cases following the Bond-Paulson analysis, Harris, supra
note 59, at 1403 n.25.
84.
Paulson, 463 P.2d at 936-37.
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under the definition of "common schools" and were to be
"free."85 First, the activity fee was held to constitute a charge
on attendance contrary to the constitutional mandate for free
schools. 86 The court, however, would allow social and extracurricular activity fees to be charge if they "cover[ed] costs of
such activities to be paid by students who wish to exercise the
option to participate in them."87 Textbook fees were then held
invalid by the court. The court found that textbooks were
"necessary elements of any school's activity" and thus fell
under the free school guarantee. 88 In making this
determination, the court focused on the lack of control or choice
the student has over the textbooks used. 89
2. Bond v. Ann Arbor School District.

The Supreme Court of Michigan followed Paulson in Bond
v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist. 90 This case also involved a challenge
to textbook and supply fees. 91 The court struck down the fees
determining that "free" under the Michigan constitution meant
"without cost or charge ...."92 The court then applied both
the "necessary elements of any school's activity test" from
Paulson, and an additional test, requiring anything that was
an "integral fundamental part of the elementary and secondary
education. . . " to be free. 93 The court concluded that
textbooks and supplies fell into this category and were
essential to the public school system. 94
85.
!d. at 937.
ld. at 938. Idaho Const. art. IX § 1, states that "it shall be the duty of the
86.
legislature of Idaho to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough
system of public, free common schools."
87.
Paulson, 463 P.2d at 938.
88.
ld.
89.
!d. at 939. The court stated:
[T]he student has no choice in the quality or quantity of textbooks he will
use if he is to earn his education. He will use exactly the books, prescribed
by the school authorities, that his classmates use; and no voluntary act of
his can obviate the need for books nor lessen their expense. School books
are, thus, indistinguishable from other fixed educational expense items such
as school building maintenance or teachers' salaries.
!d.
90.
178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970).
91.
!d. at 485.
Id. at 487. Mich Const. art. VIII § 2 reads in part: "The legislature shall
92.
maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as
defined by law."
!d. at 488.
93.
94.
ld.
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3. Validity of fees under Paulson/Bond
Courts using the Paulson I Bond analysis focus on "what
constitutes an education."95 These courts uniformly strike
down fees for textbooks, finding them to be "indistinguishable
from fixed educational expenses."96 Further, courts have
generally struck down fees for required courses and the
materials related to them. 97 Extra-curricular fees, however,
are allowed under this approach, because these activities "by
definition fall outside a district's educational program."98 It is
unclear, however, whether fees for elective courses are allowed
under this test. 99
The plain meaning rule applied in Paulson and Bond is
"more judicially sound." 10° Courts adopting this rule are "not
bound by the past and are better able to accommodate current
educational needs .... "101 The rule is "clearly defined,"
succinct and manageable. 102 It ensures that a basic level of
education is provided. 103 This analysis is an improvement
over the historical approach because it is concerned with what
presently constitutes an education rather than what did a
hundred years ago. The rule, however, still fails to satisfy the
policy objectives underlying free education even when fee
waivers are available to indigent students.
Part IV will consider the policy objectives of "free"
education and how the current analyses conflict with these
objectives. Fee waiver policies will be reviewed, concluding that
they are an inadequate substitute for a totally free education.
Finally, the paper will propose that the best approach to
providing free public education is the approach taken in

95.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1410.
96.
ld. See also Kendall, supra note 2, at 105.
97.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1410.
98.
ld.
99.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1417 ("[C]ourts . . . split over what constitutes
an education. They dispute whether an education includes required, credited
elective, or noncredited elective courses and activities."). Harris points out that
elective courses are problematic in that they are required due to credit hour
requirements for graduation yet they are elective because students may choose
from several alternatives. ld. at 1411 n. 84. SP.P. P..g., Norton v. Board. of Educ.,
553 P.2d 1277 (N.M. 1976) (holding required courses to be without charge, but
reasonable fees may be charged for elective courses).
100.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1411.
101.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 106. See also Harris, supra note 59, at 1411.
102.
Note, supra note 52, 1971 WIS. L.REV. at 980.
103.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1411.
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Hartzell v. Connell 104 striking down all fees regardless of
type.

IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:
To FEE OR NOT To FEE?

"It is the mark of a moral and humane society to assist all
human development to its fullest potential; it is a virtual
economic necessity to properly educate and train all of society's
members." 105 Currently "[t]hirty-four states permit some type
of student fees ...."106 School districts in these states have
differing policies to deal with the non-payment of fees. The
sanctions imposed on students for non-payment of fees include:
denying enrollment in school; 107 withholding grades,
transcript or diploma; 108 denying enrollment or participation
in specific classes or activities; 109 denying access to textbooks
or requiring students unable to pay to share with paying
students;110 threats or humiliation; 111 reducing grades; 112
104.
679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984).
105.
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 370. The author, quoting The Committee for
Economic Development, stated:
[T]his nation cannot continue to compete and prosper in the global arena
when more than one-fifth of our children live in poverty and a third grow
up in ignorance. And if the nation cannot compete, it cannot lead. If we
continue to squander the talents of millions of our children, America will
become a nation of limited human potential. It would be tragic if we allow
this to happen. America must become a land of opportunity-for every
child.
Id. at 368.
Hamm & Crosser, supra note 4, at 29. (drawing on the results from a
106.
survey of the departments of education in every state and the District of
Columbia).
Harris, supra note 59, at 1419. C{., Salazar v. Honig, 246 Cal. Rptr. 837,
107.
841 (Ct. App. 1988).
Harris, supra note 59, at 1419. See also Canton v. Spokane Sch. Dist. #81,
108.
498 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1974).
In re Distribution of Educational Books and Materials to Underprivileged
109.
Children in West Virginia, No. 280 at 3 (N.D. W.Va., June 17, 1977) (order
enjoining school district from charging fees to needy school children for textbooks
and other educational materials) [hereinafter In re Distribution]; Utah Issues
Information Program, Inc., SCHOOL FEES: THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE 31 (1991)
[hereinafter UTAH !SSlTES].
110.
In re Distribution, at 3.
111.
Canton, 498 F.2d at 843; Nancy Hobbs, Poor Have Enough Obstacles to an
Education, Says Group Fighting to Keep Them in School, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb.
11, 1992, at A1; UTAH IS~'UES, supra note 109, at 20, 31.
112.
Canton, 498 F.2d at 843.
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physical punishments; 113 and requiring students to work off
fee debt. 114 Some students forego taking classes requiring fees
to avoid these types of sanctions. 115 The fees and the
sanctions they perpetuate do not further the social, economic or
political goals of education. They can also be psychologically
damaging to students who must endure them.
Education is intended to break down the social barriers
between the classes and act as an equalizer, 116 "promoting
social cohesion." 117 It "prepares students for active
involvement in political affairs," 118 and fosters "those habits
of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for
responsible citizens" and "an enlightened and effective public
opinion." 119 Education produces "well rounded-human being[s]
that in and of themselves justify education."120 "Public
Education helps produce an efficient labor force ... "121 by
giving students the intellectual and communication skills and
the practical training necessary to compete in the
marketplace. 122
Fees compromise these goals by denying "some students
the benefits of full exposure to the academic variety, social
skills and activities contemplated in achieving'' them. 123 Fee

113.
!d.
114.
Hobbs, supra note 111, at A1 (student required to do janitorial work to pay
school fees); UTAH ISSUES, supra note 109, at 31 (student required to clean toilets
to pay fees).
115.
UTAH ISSUES, supra note 109, at 20, 31.
Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 35, 40 (quoting John T. Wickes, a delegate to the
116.
California Constitutional Convention, who said: "[F]or the man who has a liberal
education, if he has no money, . . . he can stand in the presence of his fellowmen with the stamp of divinity upon his brow ... .").
117.
!d. at 52.
118.
ld. at 40.
119.
ld. at 41 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)).
Persons with higher educational attainment are more able and more likely to
become involved in the political process and to influence the outcomes of those
issues that affect them. Persons with lower levels of education not only are not as
knowledgeable concerning political issues, and thus not as likely to be aware of
matters affecting themselves, but also are less well informed about the entire
political process and thus not as capable of expressing their views even when they
are aware of relevant issues. Clearly, lack of schooling or lack of good schooling
restricts one's ability to exercise political rights. Kendall, supra note 2, at 119
n.123 (quoting J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorfer, H. Levin & R. Stout, Schools and
Inequality 104-05 (1971).
120.
Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 48 (Mosk, J., concurring).
121.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1409.
C{., Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 41.
122.
123.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 117.
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programs weaken the "political, economic and social balance"
by creating barriers to communication between different social
groups. 124 They stigmatize students and keep those students
who are unable to pay the fees in a lower class, taking away
the means for them to achieve economic independence. 125 Fee
waiver programs, designed to compensate for these problems,
are grossly inadequate and only worsen the social stigma on
low income children.

A. Fee Waivers
The purpose of fee waiver policies is to "ensure that no
student is denied the opportunity to participate in a class or
school sponsored or supported activity because of an inability to
pay a fee." 126 The policies generally require some kind of
notice to parents; 127 confidentiality in the process to avoid
embarrassing students and their parents; 128 and an appeal if
the waiver is denied. 129 The policies generally allow waivers
for both curricular and extra-curricular fees. 130 Eligibility for
waivers is usually determined according to the same family
income guidelines used m the federal school lunch
program. 131 However, some policies allow others falling

124.
ld. at 120.
See id. at 119-22.
125.
UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A (1990). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-12126.
103 (1988); BURKE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SUPERINTENDENT'S GUIDELINES FOR
IMPLEMENTING POLICY ON WAIVER OF STUDENT FEES (hereinafter BURKE COUNTY
SCHOOLS).
127.
UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-5C (1990) (requiring districts to ensure written
notice to all parents or guardians of fee and fee waiver policies within a
reasonable time before fees become due); BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § II (requiring
minimal notice of waiver policy to be sent home with each student at or before the
beginning of each term). See also Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 38 (in addition to feewaiver policy "[t]eachers and coaches are asked to inform their principals of any
students . . . expected to participate . . . " who do not.).
128.
BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § Ill. UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A(2-3) (1990)
reads:
The waiver policy shall include procedures to ensure that:

***

(2) the process for obtaining waivers or pursuing alternatives is
administered fairly, objectively and without delay, and avoids stigma and
unreasonable burdens on students and parents;
(3) students who have been granted waivers or provisions in lieu of fee
waivers are not treated differently from other students or identified to
persons who do not need to know;
UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407A(8)(1990); BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § III.
129.
130.
BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § IV; UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-1A (1990).
131.
BURKE COUNTY SCHOOLS § III; UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A(5)(a) (1990)
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outside this category to qualify, 132 and some districts simply
determine the eligibility for waivers on a case by case
basis. 133 These policies appear to alleviate any inequality in
access to education. However, because administration of the
policies is left to local school administrators, they have not
achieved the goal of alleviating the inequalities and in many
cases have caused greater harm to students. 134
When administration of fee waiver policies is left to the
local districts, many times the policies are not implemented, or
are inadequately implemented, 135resulting in severe long
term harm to students and increases in societal costs. 136

(inability to pay is presumed for those receiving public assistance or free school
lunch).
UTAH ADMIN. R. R300-407-6A(5)(b) (1990) (allows a case by case
132.
determination for those not on public assistance or school lunch who have
extenuating circumstances limiting their ability to pay school fees).
133.
See Marshall, 553 P.2d at 785 (citing Colorado Constitution which requires
school boards to provide books to indigent children without charge upon written
statement of a teacher that the parents of such children are unable to pay); Sneed,
264 S.E.2d at 110 (discussing practice of granting fee waivers on a case by case
basis, in the absence of a uniform waiver policy or procedure).
134.
See Hobbs, supra note 111.
See Salazar, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (districts failed to notify parents of fee
135.
waiver policy, and some districts refused application for the waiver).
A Dec. 1991 survey of fee waiver policies in Utah revealed the following: 21 of
41 districts failed to provide notice of waivers, 16 of 33 districts providing a policy
stated the eligibility guidelines incorrectly, 14 districts provide no guarantee of
confidentiality and 19 districts failed to ensure that the procedures did not create
stigmas or unreasonable burdens on parents or students. In addition eight school
districts in Utah authorized fees for students in grades six and below, although
such fees are specifically prohibited by the Utah Constitution. UTAH ISSUES, supra
note 106, at 38-40.
The survey of parents revealed that students felt restricted in choosing classes
and activities because of the fees. They were threatened with denial of grades or
transcripts or actually denied these because they had not paid the school fee.
Students who were automatically eligible under the Utah rules were denied
waivers for all or some of the fees. ld. at 20, 33.
The anecdotal information included in this report recorded many instances
where parents were intimidated, badgered and threatened for not paying the school
fees. It is clear from this survey that the Utah policy is far from being uniformly
applied to all eligible students. ld. at 20-37.
The Utah Issues survey revealed that some parents had to forgo paying
136.
rent, utilities or buying groceries in order to pay the required school fees, and in
some cases the students simply dropped out of school rather than face the
humiliation of not being able to pay the fees, or applying for a waiver. UTAH
ISb1JES, supra note 109, at 44.
Kendall has also argued that:
[T]hese waivers do not adequately alleviate the psychological impact upon
the indigent child. Any fee waiver procedure is a potentially degrading
experience to the child or parent unable to pay the additional costs
incumbent upon a "free" education. Children may feel singled out and

'I
I

i

166

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1993

"Even the most efficiently administered procedure risks
stigmatizing students who need a fee waiver." 137 "[T]o a child
or his parents who are unable to pay the additional fees ...
any waiver procedure is a degrading experience," whether it is
efficient or not. 138
Besides being inadequately applied, the fee waiver policies
are not comprehensive enough to cover all of the students who
may be unable to pay. 139 Those who are not eligible for free
school lunches or who have several children in school may be
just as unable to pay fees as those who do receive waivers.
Thus, the waiver policies do not alleviate the barriers to equal
access to education for all children. Even if waiver programs
were adequately administered, they are not adequate
substitutes for "free" education, because they would not help
those children outside the standard eligibility requirements,
and they stigmatize the families receiving waivers regardless of
the efficiency of the waiver program.

B. Solutions
It has been suggested that the best approach to the school
fees problem is to "prohibit fees for all courses carrying credit
toward graduation, including any textbooks and materials
necessary to complete these course offerings," and provide fee
waivers for extra-curricular fees. 140 This analysis takes into
consideration the financial constraints on school districts, 141
while "ensuring provision of a basic education." 142 This
analysis, however, does not alleviate the problems with fee
waiver programs that were discussed above. Such an analysis
fails to take into account the important role extra-curricular
programs play in the educational scheme.
Extra-curricular activities are "generally recognized as a
fundamental ingredient of the educational process." 143 They
stigmatized by their peers. Furthermore, fee waiver procedures impose an
administrative barrier many may simply prefer not to cross.
Kendall, supra note 2, at 122.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1420. See also Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 44.
137.
138.
Granger v. Cascade County Sch. Dist. No.1, 499 P.2d 780, 786 (Mont.
1972).
139.
See Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 52 ("[T]he waiver is available only to those
students who meet a specified standard of need.").
140.
Harris, supra note 59, at 1420-21.
141.
!d.
142.
!d. at 1411.
Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 42 (citations omitted).
143.
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have become so "interwoven with ... curricular subjects" that
"it is impossible to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation
between them." 144 They teach students the important
principles of 'justice, fair play and good citizenship."145 These
activities are generally sponsored by the schools, and school
personnel supervise the students and handle preparations. 146
They "form an integral and vital part of the educational
program." 147 Charging a fee for these activities creates an
"attitude of exclusion" which would defeat the goals of public
education. 148
A better policy is to interpret the term "free" in its
broadest sense and prohibit all fees in the public schools. The
Supreme Court of California took this approach in Hartzell v.
Connell. 149 The court, in this case, faced a challenge to extracurricular activity fees. 150 Interpreting the California
Constitution according to the Bond test, 151 the court struck
down the extra-curricular fees finding that they were an
"integral component of public education."152 The court
reasoned that the importance of extra-curricular activities had
been found in a variety of other contexts, including:
desegregation cases, teacher assignment cases, educational
expenditure cases, and cases determining the scope of schoolrelated tort liability. 153

144.
Id. at 42 n.12 (citation omitted).
145.
!d. at 42 (quoting McGrath v. Burkhard, 280 P.2d 864 (Cal. 1955)).
146.
!d. at 38.
147.
!d. at 43 (citation omitted).
148.
Pepe & Tufts, supra note 52, at 1015.
149.
679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984).
150.
Id. at 36.
151.
!d. at 38-39. The court first noted that "[t]he California Constitution
requires the Legislature to 'provide for a system of common schools by which a
free school shall be kept up and supported in each district ... .' (Cal. Const., art.
IX, § .5)" Id. at 38. It then went on to apply the Bond approach which holds that
the free school guarantee extends to all activities which constitute an "integral
fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education" or which amount to
"necessary elements of any school's activity." Id. at 39 (quoting Bond v. Ann Arbor
Sch. Dist., 178 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1970).
152.
!d. at 42. The court quoting JOHNSON & FAUNCE, STUDENT ACTIVITIES IN
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 6-7 (19.52), stated:
A concept which finds general acceptance today is that which identifies the
curriculum with the experiences of the pupil. If the fundamental task of the
school is to prepare children for life, the curriculum must be as wide as life
itself. It should be thought of as comprising all the activities and
experiences afforded by the community through the school . . ..
!d. at 42 n.12.
1.53.
!d. at 42-43.
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The court rejected the Paulson approach, determining that
its focus on whether an activity was offered for credit was
insufficient to "ensure compliance with California's free school
guarantee." 154 This approach, the court noted, would allow a
fee to be charged for a non-credit program with "identical
content-and equal value" as a program for which no fee is
charged. 155
Finally, the court held that the available fee-waiver
provision did not meet the constitutional requirement of "free"
schools. 156 The court stated:
The free school guarantee reflects the people's judgment that a
child's public education is too important to be left to the budgetary
circumstances and decisions of individual families. It makes no
distinction between needy and nonneedy families. Individual
families, needy or not, may value education more or less depending
upon conflicting budget priorities .... "[l]f left to their own unaided
efforts, a great majority of the people will fail through want of
means to properly educate their children; another class, with means
at command, will fail through want of interest. The people then, can
be educated only by a system of Free Schools, supported by taxation,
and controlled directly by the people." 157

The court recognized the limitations on funding faced by school
districts, but concluded that "financial hardship [was] no
defense to a violation of the free school guarantee." 158
In sum the court concluded that "access to public education
is a right enjoyed by all-not a commodity for sale. Educational
opportunities must be provided to all students without regard
to their families' ability or willingness to pay fees or request
special waivers." 159 And, solutions to the funding difficulties
"must be found elsewhere-for example, through the political
process." 160 All states should follow California's lead, as it
implements the soundest approach to the problem of school fees
and achieves the educational goals of "Free Schools."

154.
155.
156.

ld. at 41.
!d.

158.

ld. at 44.
Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 43 (citation omitted).
!d. at 44.

159.

!d.

160.

ld.

157.
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CONCLUSION

Challenges to school fees brought in federal courts will
likely be unsuccessful. The best forum for changes in school fee
policies is at the state level. Most states provide for free
education in their constitutions. Those that do not should adopt
free school guarantees, to ensure that all children in their
states are provided with the education they need to become
productive citizens. Although different approaches are taken to
the interpretation of "free school" guarantees, the best
approach is that taken by the California court in Hartzell. It
achieves the goals of public education and ensures that
children of needy families are not excluded or stigmatized by
ineffective fee waiver policies. Although this approach may
create financial hardships for school districts, or force them to
make tough choices regarding what kinds of extra-curricular
programs to offer, the alternative damage to students created
by ineffective fee policies outweigh the need for some of these
programs. "If the schools' existence benefits the entire
community, then their complete maintenance and functioning
should be the responsibility of that community." 161 A
community should provide what it can to all children rather
than exclude some solely because they are unable to pay.
Holly J. Foster

161.

Note, supra note 52, at 981 (emphasis added).

